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NOTES
Forever on the Installment Plan? An
Examination of the Constitutional
History of the Copyright Clause and
Whether the Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders’
Intent
Kevin D. Galbraith*
INTRODUCTION
According to the terms of our Constitution, “Congress shall have
the power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 That the
founders chose to insert this clause at all seems remarkable, given the
broad strokes with which they drafted the Constitution.2 Why would
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., Government,
Connecticut College, 1992. The author would like to thank Professor William Treanor,
Fordham University School of Law, for helpful research guidance; Professor Martin
Flaherty, Fordham University School of Law, for his insights on the uses of history in
interpreting the Constitution, generously provided on an earlier version of this paper; Elise
Clark for her careful and thorough editing; and his wife and family for their enthusiastic
support.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is referred to alternately as the Copyright Clause or
the Intellectual Property Clause. As this Note looks at copyright specifically rather than
intellectual property as a whole, which would include at least patents, and in some circles
trade secrets and trademarks as well, I will use the former.
2
For example, courts and citizens have puzzled for over two hundred years over the
meaning of expansive terms such as “due process” and “cruel and unusual punishment.”
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, and XIV; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723
(1997) (holding that the right to physician-assisted suicide was not a fundamental right
protected by due process); Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999) (holding that a
death-row inmate had waived his claim that execution by lethal gas violated his Eighth
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they take the time to confer a monopoly right in a text seeking to
guide a newly free nation? Monopolies, even limited ones, were
anathema to late-eighteenth-century political sensibilities,3 and it is
worth asking what tipped the scales in their favor when the founders
attempted to balance cultural progress and the monopoly-like
property rights granted by copyright.
Contemporaneous accounts reveal that the Copyright Clause
gained passage with neither debate nor dissent at the Federal
Convention in Philadelphia.4 As a result, modern observers
attempting to discern the original meaning of the Copyright Clause
must look at other records. These records include copyright statutes
passed by various states at the urging of the Continental Congress,
each characterized by the desire to promote cultural progress through
securing literary rights to authors;5 the writings of Thomas Jefferson
raised serious objections rooted in his strong distaste for
monopolies—a distaste with a long colonial pedigree— in multiple
letters to James Madison;6 the writings of Madison, his Federalist
advocacy for consolidated power here embodied in his strong
support for national copyright protection—this support is registered
in his primary reference to the clause, contained in Federalist 43;7
and the text of the Copyright Act of 17908 passed by the First
Congress. It is only upon a careful examination of these and other
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment).
3
See Timothy R. Phillips, The Unconstitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998, Opposing Copyright Extension 2-6, 22-23 n.3 (detailing the various contexts in
which the founders expressed their distaste for monopolies, including the fact that the traderestrictive Navigation Acts were among the grounds cited for declaring independence from
England), at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyright Extension/
constitutionality/phillips02.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); see also FORREST MCDONALD,
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 17-18 (1985)
(describing colonists’ arguably overblown fear of monopoly).
4
Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why did the Framers
Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361 (1992); see also Edward
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and
Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 26-27 (1994).
5
See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
7
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
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records that we can determine the value of history in assessing the
constitutionality of the modern copyright regime.
Since the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, Congress and our
courts have granted steadily increasing protection to copyright
holders. This paper will discuss the following question: Do the
protections granted under modern copyright law exceed the
founders’ intent, or more specifically, does the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 19989 (hereinafter “CTEA”) exceed the powers
granted to Congress by the Copyright Clause? Balancing the dual
policies of encouraging creativity and protecting public access, this
Note will explore whether the current state of copyright law is
weighted too heavily in favor of copyright protection, defeating the
founders’ intent by listing dangerously toward true monopoly, as
many commentators have argued,10 and whether the history of the
Copyright Clause provides enough evidence for modern observers to
reach a well supported conclusion.11
9

Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
Perhaps the most comprehensive and helpful conceptual framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of copyright provisions has been developed by Paul J. Heald and Suzanna
Sherry in their article, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property
Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1167 (2000).
They posit several principles that the Supreme Court must weigh if it is to remain true to the
founders’ intent:
When the Court addresses the constitutionality of statutes that might possibly
run afoul of the Intellectual Property Clause, it is likely to allow Congress
significant flexibility but only within the constraints of four principles of
constitutional weight: 1. The Suspect Grant Principle: Scrutiny under the
Intellectual Property Clause is only triggered when Congress effects a grant of
exclusive rights that imposes monopoly-like costs on the public; 2. The Quid
Pro Quo Principle: A suspect grant may only be made as part of a bargainedfor exchange with potential authors or inventors; 3. The Authorship Principle:
A suspect grant must initially be made to either the true author of a writing or
to the party responsible for a new advance in the useful arts; 4. The Public
Domain Principle: A suspect grant may not significantly diminish access to
the public domain.
Heald and Sherry conclude that the CTEA, both in its prospective and retroactive
applications, does not pass constitutional muster. Id. at 1168-76. Regardless of how one
comes out in the application of these core principles, the framework remains valuable.
11
Regarding the uses and abuses of history at the hands of legal scholars, lawyers, and
courts, see generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (persuasively arguing that “constitutional
discourse is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at
10
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Part One begins in the present, focusing on the CTEA, including
its policy rationales, its text, and Eldred v. Reno (hereinafter
“Eldred”),12 the constitutional challenge to the CTEA that is now
before the Supreme Court.13 While this suit was brought on both
First Amendment and Copyright Clause grounds, this Note will focus
on the latter, in which plaintiffs argue that the monopoly-like
property rights represented by copyright have been unduly extended
with no appreciable promotion of progress. With the current case
law on the table, Part Two steps back to place the Copyright Clause
in historical context, looking at its predecessor in England, the
Statute of Anne.14 This Part will also examine the contemporaneous
late-eighteenth-century approaches to copyright protection,
specifically the state copyright statutes adopted in the period between
the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Convention, and the
effectiveness—or lack thereof—of those statutes.15 After looking at
the copyright protections granted in the time leading up to the
Federal Convention, this Part will trace the Copyright Clause from
introduction and adoption by the Federal Convention through
ratification by the state ratifying conventions, including support
rooted in the desires to grant increasing power to the national
government and to promote cultural progress expressed by Madison,
worst, howlers”). Id. at 525; EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT
(2000) (providing a useful overview of copyright law through the ages).
12
74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing en
banc denied, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 70 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01-618).
13
See Supreme Court to Intervene in Copyright Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 19,
2002, available at 2002 WL 13778135; see also Openlaw: Eldred v. Ashcroft (a
comprehensive website addressing the factual and legal developments of this case,
maintained by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School), at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft (last visited Apr. 15, 2002); James
Surowiecki, Righting Copywrongs, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2002 (describing the factual
background to Eldred and spelling out some of Professor Lawrence Lessig’s criticisms of
the growing trend toward “property-rights fundamentalism” in the realm of intellectual
property),
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?talk
/020121ta_talk_surowiecki (last visited Apr. 15, 2002); see generally Opposing Copyright
Extension (maintained by Professor Dennis S. Karjala of Arizona State University, this
website contains well chosen links and documents central to the case), at
http://www.law.asu.edu/ HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/default.htm (last
visited Apr. 12, 2002).
14
8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
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and strong objections grounded in the fear of monopolies lodged by
Jefferson.
Part Three will explore the terms of the Copyright Act of 1790,16
passed by the First Congress. The First Congress comprised many
founders whose understanding of the power granted (to authors via
the Congress) by the Copyright Clause may be helpful as modern
observers attempt to discern the constitutional validity of expanding
copyright protection.17 In addition, this Part will briefly review the
ever-expanding terms of copyright protection contained in the
Copyright Acts of 1831,18 1909,19 and 1976.20
Both sides in Eldred have advanced historical arguments regarding
the extent of Congress’s power, the appropriate level of judicial
deference to that power, and the promotion of progress that is
expected to underlie any statutory copyright protection. With the
historical context provided by Parts Two and Three in mind, Part
Four will evaluate these arguments in light of the evidence available.
This Part will discuss both the arguments’ disposition by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the versions of those
arguments now before the Supreme Court, as expressed in the briefs
seeking and opposing a writ of certiorari, and in the amicus briefs
filed to date. This Note will conclude by assessing the usefulness of
history in determining the constitutional validity of the CTEA,
finding that while the CTEA is assailable on multiple appealing
policy grounds, it is likely to survive any history-based constitutional
scrutiny.

15

See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
17
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (positing that the
construction of the Constitution by those “contemporary with its formation, many of whom
were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight”).
This language is axiomatic, and both plaintiffs and defendants in Eldred point to it, albeit to
advance very different arguments. 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372
(D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc denied, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. granted, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 70 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01618).
18
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436.
19
17 U.S.C. § 12 (1909) (repealed 1978).
20
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., 90 Stat. 2541 (2001).
16

FRMT5.GLBRTH

1124

5/17/02 3:11 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

I. THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT OF 1998 AND THE
CHALLENGE TO ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY
The First Congress, which included many founders, interpreting
the Copyright Clause in the Copyright Act of 1790,21 chose a
protection term of fourteen years, followed by an equal renewal term,
resulting in a maximum duration of twenty-eight years. By 1978,
when the Copyright Act of 197622 went into effect, the term of
copyright had been radically expanded to life plus fifty years, so that
if an author wrote a book at age thirty, and lived until she was
seventy, the term of protection would be ninety years. As if that was
not difficult enough to square with the founders’ intent when they
wrote “for limited times,” next came the CTEA,23 extending the
copyright term to life plus seventy years, bringing the total length of
exclusive rights in the above example to 110 years, eighty-two years
longer than the term the First Congress thought was required to
“promote progress.”24
The primary rationale given for this latest extension was
harmonizing U.S. law with that of the European Union, 25 which, in
21

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., 90 Stat. 2541 (2001).
23
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
24
Despite the striking disparity between the fourteen-year term contained in the 1790
Act and the life-plus-seventy-years term in the CTEA, proponents nevertheless advanced a
demographic argument in justifying the extension, writing that it “merely modifies the
length of protection in nominal terms to reflect the scientific and demographic changes that
have rendered the life-plus-[fifty] term insufficient to meet [the aim of protecting the author
and at least one generation of heirs].” S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 11 (1998).
25
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-452 (1998); see also S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1998) (stating
that the twenty-year extension will “provide significant trade benefits by substantially
harmonizing U.S. copyright law to that of the European Union”). This rationale has been
widely criticized by commentators arguing that 1) the CTEA does not achieve
harmonization with European Union law, and 2) even if it had, such a goal does not change
the fact that it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and
the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 639 (1996) (pointing out
that “uniformity with respect to the term of copyright protection remains an unrealistic goal
even as between the United States and the European Union, which otherwise share a
common concern for high levels of protection for cultural goods. When the rest of the world
is factored into the calculus, the goals of greater uniformity and harmonization than that
which occurred under the TRIPS Agreement become chimerical, indeed.”); S. REP. NO.
104-315, at 31-32 (1998) (containing the remarks of Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), in which
22
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1995, extended the copyright term of its member states to life plus
seventy years.26 Other rationales cited were: providing additional
incentive for authors to create new works; providing additional
incentive for holders of existing copyrights to restore older works
and further disseminate them to the public;27 and allowing authors to
pass the financial benefits of their creativity on to their children and
grandchildren.28 The extension of the term, its application to existing
copyrights, and the rationales given by Congress, are analyzed both
below and in Part Four.

he states, “We are not a member of the European Union. The European Union does not
determine our treaty obligations.” Senator Brown goes on to point out that “this bill does
not harmonize the American concept of copyrights with that of European countries,” and “if
we passed this bill, we would be further distancing our laws from EU laws, not harmonizing
them.”); Heald & Sherry, supra note 10, at 1171 (arguing that “[t]he desire to cooperate
with the international community may be a worthy goal, but it is not a blanket justification
for passing otherwise unconstitutional legislation,” and drawing the comic analogy that
“granting Heineken the exclusive right to brew beer in the United States might help our
relations with Holland, but Congress could not make such a grant.”); Marci A. Hamilton,
Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 655, 660 (1996) (taking a somewhat more hard-line position that “the seemingly amoral
goal of international standardization is in fact a shield behind which less public-spirited
interests may seek their own ends.”).
26
Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290/9) (cited in S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 10
(1998)).
27
See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1998) (stating that “by stimulating the creation of new
works and providing enhanced economic incentives to preserve existing works,” the twentyyear extension “will enhance the long-term volume, vitality, and accessibility of the public
domain.”). These arguments, particularly regarding the extension’s effect on the public
domain, have been hotly contested. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of
Law Libraries et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft (2001) (No. 01-618) (containing a chart representing
Professor Peter Jaszi’s understanding of the deleterious effects of repeated copyright term
extensions on the growth rate of the public domain).
28
H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (listing among the purposes of the term extension
the fact that “[a]uthors will be able to pass along to their children and grandchildren the
financial benefits of their works”). This justification also came under fire from Senate
Judiciary Committee member Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI). See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 38
(1998) (advancing his argument in terms more charitable than those used by more vitriolic
critics: “Congress has recognized the legitimate need and desire of an artist to leave a legacy
to his heirs. However, it is not and cannot be a first order justification” for the twenty-year
extension. “Of course, some of the people who would benefit from this measure—like the
heirs of the American composers whose copyrights are about to expire—are decent and
hardworking. But just because they are decent people does not mean that they should
continue to receive royalties for an extra [twenty] years for work they did not create and at
the expense of the American consumer.”).
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A. Eldred v. Reno
To date, opponents of the CTEA have mounted one serious
challenge to its constitutionality. In Eldred,29 multiple plaintiffs
argued on several grounds that the CTEA violated the Constitution.
For purposes of this Note, I will focus on their claims that the statute
violated the “for limited times” portion of the Copyright Clause,
leaving aside the First Amendment and public trust doctrine
arguments.
Plaintiffs were several individuals and corporations, each of which
“use, copy, reprint, perform, enhance, restore or sell works of art,
film, or literature in the public domain.”30 They had prepared to use
works created before 1923, relying on the fact that they would have
entered the public domain had it not been for the CTEA, which
prevented them from legally copying, distributing, or performing
these works by virtue of its retroactive term extension.31
1. The District Court
The district court begins with the text of the Copyright Clause,
then briefly details the rights and terms provided by the Copyright
Act of 1790, noting that Congress has since repeatedly “revised and
extended these exclusive rights for limited times.”32 After spelling
out the plaintiffs’ objections, the court summarily dismisses them,
citing authorities for what it holds to be three dispositive
propositions: 1) “Congress defines the scope of the grants of
copyrights to authors . . . under its copyright clause power;”33
29

74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Eldred I].
Id. at 2; see generally Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader, THE BOSTON GLOBE
MAGAZINE, Aug. 29, 1999 (containing helpful background information on Eric Eldred’s
web-based electronic library comprised largely of public domain works, and on the genesis
available
at
of
this
lawsuit),
http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/829/featurestory1.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2002); see also Eldritch Press, at
http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
31
Eldred I, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 2.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 3 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
Here, the Court asserts in a footnote that the “introductory language of the copyright clause
30
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2) “The ‘limited times’ period is “subject to the discretion of
Congress;”34 and 3) “Congress has authority to enact retrospective
laws under the copyright clause.”35 With these three precedents to
gird its ruling, the court “concludes that the CTEA’s extension of
limited times is within the discretion of Congress”36 and grants
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
2. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia,37 advancing the same arguments with the same result.38
At the appellate level, however, both the majority and the dissent
make extensive historical arguments in reaching their respective
conclusions.
Early in the opinion, Judge Ginsburg, writing for the majority,
acknowledges that the CTEA “applies retrospectively in the sense
that it extends the terms of subsisting copyrights.”39 The court notes
that this is not unusual in the U.S. copyright regime, however, and
traces the history of U.S. copyright law from the Copyright Act of
179040 through the Copyright Act of 197641 to underscore its point

does not limit” Congress’s power in this realm, citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102,
112 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Id. at n.6. With this conclusion, the court takes the step required to
decide this case in defendant’s favor without inquiring as to whether Congress has
adequately emphasized the promotion of science and useful arts when enacting the CTEA.
34
Id. (citing Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1829)).
35
Id. (citing McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843)). Here, the court
drops a footnote stating, “[w]ithin the discretion of Congress, any fixed term is a limited
time because it is not perpetual. If a limited time is extended for a limited time then it
remains a limited time.” Id. at n.7. With this statement the court appears to insulate any
future statutory extension of the copyright term from constitutional challenge, provided it
does not grant an infinite term.
36
Id.
37
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Eldred II].
38
Id. at 373.
39
Id.
40
Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
41
Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 302-05, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76 (1976) (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.).
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that retroactivity of term extension has not been seen as
objectionable since the earliest days of copyright protection.42
The court then explains that the plaintiffs challenge the
constitutionality of the CTEA because, “in extending the term of
subsisting copyrights, the CTEA violates the ‘limited times’
requirement of the Copyright Clause—a requirement that they say is
informed by the goal of ‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.’”43 After providing this background, the court states
what must be the starting point for any discussion of the “limited
times” provision of the Copyright Clause: “If the Congress were to
make copyright protection permanent, then it surely would exceed
the power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause.”44
The court describes the plaintiffs’ position as follows: “The
present plaintiffs want a limit well short of the rule against
perpetuities, of course. And they claim to have found it—or at least
a bar to extending the life of a subsisting copyright—in the preamble
of the Copyright Clause: ‘The Congress shall have power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”45 The court
further explains the plaintiffs’ argument: “Their idea is that the
phrase ‘limited Times’ should be interpreted not literally but as
reaching only as far as is justified by the preambular statement of
purpose: If 50 years are enough to ‘promote . . . Progress,’ then a
grant of 70 years is unconstitutional.”46 The court quickly dismisses
this argument, pointing to its precedent in Schnapper v. Foley47
where it “rejected the argument ‘that the introductory language of the
Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power.’”48
As the bulk of the majority opinion directly confronts arguments
advanced by the dissent, I will go through those arguments
before turning to the majority’s counterarguments. Judge Sentelle,

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 374.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 377-78.
667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 378 (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981)).

FRMT5.GLBRTH

2002]

5/17/02 3:11 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY & THE CTEA

1129

dissenting in part, writes that the CTEA’s twenty-year extension of
copyright terms for existing works violates the Constitution.
Judge Sentelle begins by analogizing the case before the Court to
United States v. Lopez,49 where the Supreme Court invalidated the
Gun-Free School Zones Act,50 holding that the Act exceeded the
“outer limits” of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
Judge Sentelle reasons that it is “apparent that this concept of ‘outer
limits’ to enumerated powers applies not only to the Commerce
Clause but to all the enumerated powers, including the Copyright
Clause.”51 The dissent looks at the Copyright Clause as a whole:
“The clause is not an open grant of power to secure exclusive rights.
It is a grant of a power to promote progress.”52
Building upon that view, the dissent points out that while “the
majority acknowledges that ‘[i]f the Congress were to make
copyright protection permanent, then it surely would exceed the
power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause,’”53 it argues that
“there is no apparent substantive distinction between permanent
protection and permanently available authority to extend originally
limited protection.”54
Fleshing out this thought, the dissent
extrapolates from the majority’s holding: “The Congress that can
extend the protection of an existing work from 100 years to 120
years, can extend that protection from 120 years to 140; and from
140 to 200; and from 200 to 300; and in effect can accomplish

49

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990) (forbidding “any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that [he] knows . . . is a school zone”).
51
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 381 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs have seized on Judge
Sentelle’s invocation of Lopez, one of the originalists’ most powerful invocations of history
used to strike down legislation as beyond the Constitution’s grant of power, illustrating that
conservatives do not have a monopoly on originalism. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 5, 7, Eldred v. Ashcroft (2001) (No. 01-618); see also Horowitz, Is Congress Mickey
Mouse-ing with Copyrights?, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002 (quoting lead counsel and
Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Lessig: “This is truly one of those unique cases where the
issues are not political. This is about interpreting the original intent of the Constitution.”),
available at http://www.law.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
52
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 381.
53
Id. at 381-82.
54
Id. at 382.
50
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precisely what the majority admits it cannot do directly.”55
Returning to its Lopez analogy, the dissent contends that this type of
unrestrained exercise of Congressional power “exceeds the proper
understanding of enumerated powers reflected in the Lopez principle
of requiring some definable stopping point.”56
Combining textual and historical rhetoric, the dissent carries the
point further: “Returning to the language of the clause itself, it is
impossible that the [f]ramers of the Constitution contemplated
permanent protection, either directly obtained or attained through the
guise of progressive extension of existing copyrights,”57 for the
simple reason that “[e]xtending existing copyrights is not promoting
useful arts, nor is it securing exclusivity for a limited time.”58
Next the dissent turns to the majority’s reliance on Schnapper,
arguing that case should be read narrowly: “Though, under
Schnapper, we may not require that each use of a copyright
protection promote science and the arts, we can require that the
exercise of power under which those applications occur meet the
language of the clause which grants the Congress the power to enact
the statute in the first place. This the [CTEA] does not do.”59
Following this reasoning, the dissent concludes that it “is not within
the enumerated power.”60

55

Id. Seeking support for their arguments that the CTEA was originally intended to
extend the copyright protection term beyond constitutional limits, commentators have
(somewhat gleefully) pointed to the remarks of Representative Mary Bono (R-CA):
“Actually, [the late] Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever. I
am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you
to work with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you
know, there is also Jack Valenti’s proposal for the term to last forever less one day. Perhaps
the Committee may look at that next Congress.” 144 CONG. REC. H9946, 9952 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono). See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsberg, Wendy J. Gordon,
Arthur R. Miller & William F. Patry, Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term
Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 652 (thenProfessor Patry referring to the above statement).
56
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 382.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 383.
60
Id.
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Finally, the dissent critiques the majority’s historical claims
regarding the Copyright Act of 1790: “The enactment by the [F]irst
Congress in 1790 regularizing the state of copyright law with respect
to works protected by state acts preexisting the Constitution
appears . . . to be sui generis.”61 Here, Judge Sentelle points out
what he sees as the logical flaw in the majority’s reliance on the
initial federal copyright statute: “Necessarily, something had to be
done to begin the operation of federal law under the new federal
Constitution. [The Copyright Act of 1790] created the first . . .
federal copyright protection; it did not extend subsisting federal
copyrights enacted pursuant to the Constitution.”62
In its opinion, the court addresses the dissent’s criticisms squarely.
While maintaining that Congress’s power to grant copyright
protection is not encumbered by the “promot[ing] progress”
language, the majority argues that even if it were, the CTEA would
satisfy that requirement. For support, the court points to Congress’s
finding that “extending the duration of copyrights on existing works
would . . . give copyright holders an incentive to preserve older
works, particularly motion pictures in need of restoration.”63
Next, the court mounts a textual and historical attack on the
dissent’s objection to this extension of copyright term protection:
“The dissent identifies nothing in text or in history that suggests that
a term of years for a copyright is not a ‘limited [t]ime’ if it may later
be extended for another ‘limited [t]ime.’”64 Having found the dissent
lacking either textual or historical support, the court continues,
“Instead, the dissent suggests that the Congress—or rather, many
successive Congresses—might in effect confer a perpetual copyright
by stringing together an unlimited number of ‘limited [t]imes,’
although that clearly is not the situation before us.”65
61

Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 384.
Id. (emphasis in original, citations omitted). The dissent, however, ignores the fact
that later term extensions were written to apply to existing copyrights as well.
63
Id. at 379 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 12 (1996)).
64
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 379.
65
Id. (pointing to the claim that the CTEA matches U.S. copyrights to the terms of
copyrights found in the European Union, a motivation the dissent finds irrelevant, as
members of the European Union are not bound in their intellectual property laws by the U.S.
62
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The court goes on to take a somewhat expansive view of
“promot[ing] progress” as directed by the preambular language of
the Copyright Clause: “As for the dissent’s objection that extending a
subsisting copyright does nothing to ‘promote [p]rogress,’ we think
that implies a rather crabbed view of progress: Preserving access to
works that would otherwise disappear—not enter the public domain
but disappear—‘promotes [p]rogress’ as surely as does stimulating
the creation of new works.”66
Pointing out what it sees as another vulnerability in the dissent’s
historical position, the court argues that “[t]he position of our
dissenting colleague is made all the more difficult because the First
Congress made the Copyright Act of 1790 applicable to subsisting
copyrights arising under the copyright laws of the several states.”67
Here, the court fails to respond to the dissent’s critique of its logic,
where the dissent writes that the fact that the Copyright Act of 1790
extended subsisting copyrights will not support an historical
argument because it was the first federal copyright legislation, and as
such, contained sui generis protection for those works previously
covered only by state laws.68
Nevertheless, the majority bolsters its historical position by citing
authority for the proposition that the work of the First Congress
should be carefully considered when deciding constitutional
questions: “The construction of the Constitution ‘by [those]
Constitution). Id. at 384.
66
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 379 (advancing the argument that without extended copyright
protection, those who currently control the rights to these works would have no financial
incentive to make them available, and that therefore the works would languish and be lost to
the public).
67
Id. (citing Act of May 31, 1790, §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 124-25, and further pointing to the
fact that later Congresses—in 1831, 1909, 1976, and 2000—extending the copyright term
did so for both subsisting and prospective copyrights). The inference drawn by the majority
has been disputed by commentators. See, e.g., Heald & Sherry, supra note 10, at 1151-52
(pointing to multiple reasons for retroactive copyright protection present in 1790, namely
confusion over common-law copyright, lack of uniformity among the states under the
Articles of Confederation, and arguing that the retrospective term extension of 1831 should
be seen as an “isolated incident, coming more than forty years after the first copyright act
and not repeated for another seventy-seven years,” and “is more indicative of congressional
reticence than of congressional assertion of authority.”) (citations omitted).
68
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 384.
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contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of
the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great
weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established
have not been disputed [for this long], it is almost conclusive.’”69 In
dismissing plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing
that the extension of subsisting state copyrights under the 1790 act
was simply a routine application of the Supremacy Clause, the court
reminds plaintiffs that “[a] federal law is not valid, let alone
supreme, if it is not first an exercise of an enumerated power.”70
Having prevented the plaintiffs from distinguishing a long line of
cases giving great weight to the work of the First Congress, the court
finds that just as “the First Congress was clearly secure in its power
under the Copyright Clause to extend the terms of subsisting
copyrights beyond those granted by the states,” so too was the
Congress when it enacted the CTEA.
Finally, the court follows a different course than that suggested by
the dissent when it looks to United States v. Lopez,71 instead pointing
to cases where the Supreme court defers to Congress: “Within the
realm of copyright, the Court . . . has been . . . deferential to the
judgment of the Congress. ‘As the text of the Constitution makes
plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . .
in order to give the appropriate public access to their work
product.’”72 The court concludes by applying a rational relationship
test (sometimes known as a rational basis test) and affirming the
district court’s ruling upholding validity of the CTEA, asserting that
“[t]h[e] evolution of the duration of copyright protection tellingly
illustrates the difficulties Congress faces [in exercising its copyright
power]. . . . [I]t is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress
has labored to achieve.”73

69

Id. at 379 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)).
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 379.
71
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (exerting aggressive judicial review where Congress pushed, and
in the Court’s opinion exceeded, the outer limits of the Commerce Clause).
72
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 380 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984), one of the seminal modern copyright cases).
73
Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 380 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)).
70
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Following the ruling of the court of appeals, plaintiffs petitioned
for rehearing and filed a suggestion for rehearing en banc. On a 7-2
vote, the court denied the petition,74 with both the majority and the
dissent advancing the same arguments, in abbreviated form, as they
had earlier.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. The English Predecessor to U.S. Copyright Law
In order to more thoughtfully analyze the constitutional validity of
the CTEA, it is necessary to place copyright in historical context.
When the founders assembled and considered including copyright
protection as a part of the new federal Constitution, they were
primarily influenced by copyright practice in England.75 While
copyright custom and practice in England dated back to as early as
1518, following the introduction of printing in 1476, not until 1710
was it codified.76 That was the year that the bill that became the
Statute of Anne77 was introduced. The original bill was entitled “A
Bill for the Encouragement of Learning and for securing the property
of Copies of Books to the rightful Owners therof.”78 The language
of the bill created significant controversy for two reasons: first, that it
implied with the word “securing” that a property right preexisted,
and second, that it contained no term limitation.79
After vigorous debate, the name of the bill was changed to “A Bill
for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the
Times therein Mentioned,” and contained protection terms of
fourteen years for new books, twenty-one years for existing books,
74

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and
the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 320 (2000).
76
Id. at 331-34.
77
8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
78
Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 334.
79
Id.
75
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and provided for a renewal period of fourteen years if the author was
still living at the expiration of the initial term.80 These term limits
were the result of considerable concern expressed during debate in
the House of Commons, where critics objected that a perpetual
copyright would result in a the type of unrestricted monopoly and
restraint of trade that was to be avoided at all costs.81 These
objections would be echoed later in the writings of Jefferson and
others, and in the plaintiffs’ arguments in Eldred. Nonetheless, with
minor grammatical changes, this bill was adopted and codified as the
Statute of Anne.
The Statute of Anne remained uninterpreted by the courts until
1769, when Millar v. Taylor concluded, largely on natural rights and
labor theory grounds, that copyright rested with authors as a matter
of common law, irrespective of the Statute of Anne’s term limitation
provisions.82 Just five years later, however, in Donaldson v. Becket,
the House of Lords “decided that whatever may have been the case
originally at common law, the Statute of Anne effectively limited the
term for which copyright could be enforced at common law to a
maximum of twenty-eight years.”83 While commentators have
questioned the grounds on which Donaldson v. Becket was decided,84
it remained good law during the period when copyright protection
was first being discussed in the newly formed United States, and was
the backdrop against which the merits, purposes, and potential
pitfalls of copyright were analyzed.

80
Id. at 334-35. A mystery remains as to the origins of the stated purpose of the bill,
the encouragement of learning. Legal historians disagree, but what is clear is that this
purpose was soon embraced by Parliament and later by the framers of our Constitution. Id.
at 335-36.
81
Id. at 334. As will be discussed later, this discomfort with open-ended monopolies
has surfaced every time copyright terms—or in the case of Thomas Jefferson, the inclusion
of a Copyright Clause at all—are debated.
82
Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
83
Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 340 (discussing Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408
(1774)).
84
Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 340-41 (describing the theoretical questions raised by
scholars both at the time of the decision and since).
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B. Pre-Constitutional U.S. Predecessors to the Copyright Clause
In the period between the Declaration of Independence and the
Federal Convention, while the political theories that would later be
memorialized in the Constitution were evolving, copyright protection
was a creature of the states. This lack of a national copyright regime
was the result of the fact that the Continental Congress had very little
centralized power, with the bulk of authority being reserved to its
constituent states.85
In March of 1783, the Continental Congress formed a committee
to “consider the most proper means of cherishing genius and useful
arts through the United States by securing to the authors or
publishers of new books their property in such works.”86 In May of
the same year, the committee issued its report, concluding “nothing
is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that the
protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to
encourage genius.”87 At the committee’s recommendation, the
Continental Congress passed an act to encourage all the states
(because it could not bind them) to pass copyright legislation
protecting the rights of authors, and eleven of the thirteen states did
so, with only Delaware declining.88 The Continental Congress
85
Id. at 347; see also William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System:
Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 911 (1997) (discussing the
Continental Congress’s approach to encouraging the states to enact copyright protections).
86
24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (1783), quoted in Patry, supra
note 85, at 911. This committee included James Madison, whose writings on the merits of
copyright protection in Federalist 43 will be discussed later.
87
24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326 (1783), quoted in Patry, supra
note 85, at 911.
88
Patry, supra note 85, at 911-12. At the time of this Resolution, Connecticut had
already passed state copyright legislation. An interesting sidelight to the development of
state copyright laws is the active role played by Noah Webster in securing support of many
influential framers. Seeking state copyright protection for his new school textbook on the
English language, Webster became what we would today call a lobbyist, traveling from
Pennsylvania to New Jersey, on to Connecticut and New York, and finally to Virginia,
Maryland, and Delaware, converting to his cause, among others, James Madison and George
Washington. See Donner, supra note 4, at 370-71.
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suggested that an appropriate term would be at least fourteen years,
with an additional renewal term of at least fourteen years if the
author survived the initial term.89
As the purposes of copyright protection are critical to the later
discussion of the validity of the CTEA under the Copyright Clause, it
is instructive to look at the stated purposes of these state copyright
statutes. The New Hampshire preamble is representative:
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of
civilization, and the advancement of human happiness,
greatly depend on the efforts of ingenious persons in the
various arts and sciences; as the principal encouragement
such persons can have to make great and beneficial
exertions of this nature, must consist in the legal security
of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and
as such security is one of the natural rights of all men,
there being no property more peculiarly a man’s own than
that which is produced by the labor of his mind.
Therefore, to encourage the publication of literary
productions, honorary and beneficial to the public.90
Between 1783 and 1787, the shortcomings of the copyright laws
adopted by the states at the urging of the Continental Congress
became apparent. The primary weakness of the regime was the
simple fact that one state’s laws had no effect in another state, so
authors wishing to protect their rights on a national basis were forced
to expend a great deal of time and energy traveling to the several
states to procure protection in each one.91 This objection was best
stated by James Madison, who wrote in April 1787 that the states
were “want of concert in matters where common interest requires it,”
89

24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326-27 (1783), quoted in
Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 347-48.
90
Act of Nov. 7, 1783, ch. 1, 1783, 4th Sess., N.H. Laws (Vol. 4, at 521), quoted in
Patry, supra note 85, at 912. This preamble is virtually identical to those of the
Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes. See Waltersheid, supra note 75, at 350. This
public benefit rationale lends support to the arguments of those who have challenged
copyright term extensions, though defenders of the extensions have also argued that the
extensions serve the public good as well, illustrating the malleability of policy declarations.
91
Donner, supra note 4, at 374.
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a critique made in reference to a number of matters, including the
“laws concerning . . . literary property.”92 This problem was typical
of the time under the Continental Congress, as various states with
disparate interests struggled to protect those interests with little
regard for the benefits of the nation as a whole, and with little ability
to promote any common interests even if they had so desired. As the
Federal Convention approached, the states favored copyright
protection for authors.
Widespread dissatisfaction with the
disjointed system in place under the Articles of Confederation made
clear the need for a national law.93 The time was ripe for the
inclusion of the Copyright Clause.
C. The Copyright Clause from Introduction to Ratification
Underlying the question of whether to provide for copyright
protection in the Constitution was the more fundamental debate over
how much power it was safe to grant to the central government, and
which branch could be trusted with that power. The Federalists,
leery of the growing injustices perpetrated by state legislatures in the
name of the people,94 argued vehemently that if the people’s rights
were to truly be safeguarded, it would be through a carefully crafted
national government consisting of three equal branches. They had
watched in horror as a majoritarian tyranny evolved, something
previously thought impossible. These Federalists, many authors
among them, were eager to establish the new nation as a cultural
92

Department of State, Bureau of Rolls and Library, IV DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
1786-1870 (1894-1905) 128, quoted
in Donner, supra note 4, at 374.
93
See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 192 (1968); see
also Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17
GEO. L.J. 109, 112-13 (1929) (discussing Madison’s statement and his general sensitivity to
the need for federal copyright protection).
94
See MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 155-57 (discussing the rampant abuses visited on
loyalists by state government in the post-Revolutionary period); see also Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996) (pointing to James
Madison’s recounting of Americans’ experiences under the remote, grasping English
Parliament and under the Articles of Confederation: “The legislative department,” he wrote,
“is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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force in the international arena.95 The Anti-Federalists, on the other
hand, argued vainly for robust states’ rights and a relatively weak
central government, vested with only enough power to provide the
services for which it was uniquely equipped, e.g., the common
defense. While they, too, saw the importance of literature and
learning in the life of a nation, their means of achieving such policy
goals was to reserve power to the states,96 ever fearful of power
concentrated in the hands of a distant few as they thought back to the
abusive and overreaching English Parliament whose grasping ways
precipitated the Declaration of Independence.
At the time of the Convention, while there was grumbling about a
voracious central government swallowing power, more prevalent was
the feeling that without a national government adequately
empowered, the new nation would be in real trouble, just a decade
after its birth. However, among those who supported an increasingly
centralized government, namely Federalist leaders and influential
citizens, there was great distrust of the legislative branch—seen as
“the most dangerous branch.”97 As a result, if the new Constitution
did not contain an explicit grant of Congressional power to promote
progress by securing copyright protection, Congress would not be
authorized to pass any laws in the area of literary property.98
When the Copyright Clause was presented to the Constitutional
Convention on September 5, 1787, there was no recorded debate, and
the Clause was unanimously approved.99 This clear need for
Congressional authorization, coupled with the relative scarcity of
typical sources of divining the founders’ intent in adopting a
95

Donner, supra note 4, at 362.
See MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 269-70 (discussing the controversies that arose
when express limitations on state powers were suggested in the context of militias).
97
See Flaherty, supra note 94 (discussing this perception).
98
See Donner, supra note 4, at 364-65.
99
Id. at 361; see also Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of the Useful
Arts: The Background and origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 26-27 (1994) (taking issue with the conventional
wisdom that unanimous approval without debate indicates universal approbation, instead
suggesting that those circumstances might simply indicate that the delegates were “tired,
wanted to go home, and simply did not perceive this particular grant of power to the
Congress to warrant any further debate, regardless of whether they considered it to have any
particular significance.”).
96

FRMT5.GLBRTH

1140

5/17/02 3:11 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

provision unanimously, leads observers to examine alternate sources
that might shed light on the meaning of the Copyright Clause, and
the context of its adoption.
James Madison of the Virginia delegation kept the most detailed
notes recording the proceedings of the Convention, and from those
records it appears that the first proposals for a Copyright Clause were
presented on August 18, 1787.100 There is some question as to who
deserves credit for originating the Clause, as both Madison and
Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina submitted for consideration
by the Committee of Detail provisions for copyright protection.101
Madison’s proposed Congressional powers included the power “to
secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time.”102
Pinckney proposed the power “to secure to authors exclusive rights
for a certain time.”103
On September 5, 1787, after consideration of the suggested
provisions, the Committee of Eleven reported back with the
following language: “To promote the progress of Science and useful
arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”104 On
September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to
the full Convention the entire Constitution, which contained the
Copyright Clause with the language unchanged from the September
5 version.105 On September 17, the Constitution was adopted and

100

Fenning, supra note 93, at 112-13.
Id.
102
Id. at 112 (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION (House
Document No. 398, 1927), at 563 et seq.).
103
Id. (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION (House
Document No. 398, 1927), at 563 et seq.). Clearly these proposals were nearly identical in
both purpose and phrasing, so with the possible exception of Madison’s and Pinckney’s
descendants, the unresolved question of who should be given more credit merits little
interest. As Fenning writes, “It seems impossible to fix definitely on whose brow the laurel
wreath should be placed . . . [b]ut there will probably be no great injustice in giving glory to
both Pinckney and Madison.” Id. at 117.
104
Id. at 113 (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION (House
Document No. 398, 1927), at 666).
105
Id. at 114, (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION
(House Document No. 398, 1927), at 706, 745.).
101
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signed by the delegates, and there was no recorded debate of the
Copyright Clause.106
There was some discussion regarding the Copyright Clause during
the state ratifying conventions, most notably in Pennsylvania and
North Carolina, where strong statements of support were made,
pointing to its virtues in preventing piracy of literary works and
defending it from George Mason’s attacks on the Constitution for
lacking protection of the values that would later be embodied in the
First Amendment.107 Beyond the words of these Federalist boosters,
however, the most significant piece of evidence regarding the intent
of the founders comes from Madison, who wrote:
A power ‘to promote the progress of science and useful
arts by securing, for a limited time, to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries.’ The utility of this power will scarcely
be questioned. The copyright of authors has been
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of
common law. . . . The public good fully coincides . . .
with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
106

Donner, supra note 4, at 361.
Id. at 376-77. At the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Thomas McKean, Chief
Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, drafter of the Articles of Confederation, and
former President of the Continental Congress, phrased his support this way:
[T]he power of securing to authors . . . the exclusive right to their writings . . .
could only with effect be exercised by the Congress. For, sir, the laws of the
respective states could only operate within their respective boundaries, and
therefore, a work which has cost the author his whole life to complete, when
published in one state, however it might be secured, could easily be carried
into another state in which a republication would be accompanied with neither
penalty nor punishment—a circumstance manifestly injurious to the author in
particular.
Id. (quoting II THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 415
(J. Kaminski & G. Saladino ed., 1984)). In North Carolina, James Iridell, an enthusiastic
supporter of the Constitution, responded to George Mason’s well publicized objections in
part by declaring that “the future Congress will have . . . authority . . . to secure to authors
for a limited time the exclusive privilege of publishing their works. This authority has long
been exercised in England, . . . and . . . such encouragement may give birth to many
excellent writings which would otherwise have never appeared.” Id. (quoting Marcus IV,
Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal, XVI THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 382 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino ed., 1984)).
107
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separately make effectual provision for either [copyrights
or patents], and most of them have anticipated the
decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of
Congress.108
While Madison appears to ignore the House of Lords holding in
Donaldson v. Becket that copyright was a matter governed by statute
rather than common law,109 the positive, somewhat conclusory
language of his statement both encapsulates the accepted need for
federal copyright protection and illustrates the relative lack of
controversy surrounding this provision.
The idea of promoting progress and vaulting the United States into
a place of honor on the world stage was appealing to a new and
ambitious nation, and was embraced by Federalists trying to make
their case for a strong national government. While the goal’s
sentiment was admired almost universally, the means of its
implementation was not without dispute. Some objections to the
Constitution generally, and to the Copyright Clause implicitly, were
grounded on the fear of monopolies, especially governmentsanctioned monopolies. Such fears traced their roots back to, among
others, the printing monopolies granted by the crown in England.110
George Mason in Virginia, along with the members of ratifying
conventions in New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
North Carolina, all expressed reservations. With some variation in
phrasing, they all conditioned their approval on the addition of
explicit restrictions on Congress’s power to grant monopolies.111
These reservations point up the sensitivity felt by the founders, and
108

THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
110
See MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 17-18 (arguing that Americans’ fear of monopolies
was based largely upon prejudice, lacking an understanding of how limited monopolies
helped certain industries get off the ground in England); id. at 77 (describing monopolies as
among what republican ideologues thought of as indicators of corruption and decay; others
included “standing armies, priests, bishops, aristocrats, luxury, excises, speculators, jobbers,
paper shufflers . . . bloodsuckers, and monocrats”).
111
Walterscheid, supra note 99, at 55-56 (citing Objections of the Hon. George Mason,
2 AMERICAN MUSEUM OR REPOSITORY OF ANCIENT AND MODERN FUGITIVE PIECES, ETC. 536
(1965); Ratification of the New Constitution, 4 AMERICAN MUSEUM 156; Remarks on the
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 AMERICAN MUSEUM 303).
109

FRMT5.GLBRTH

2002]

5/17/02 3:11 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY & THE CTEA

1143

go a long way toward explaining why the Copyright Clause includes
the “limited times” language.112
Thomas Jefferson, while not a member of the Federal Convention,
was indisputably a force to be reckoned with when it came to
theories and practicalities of governance. He harbored a deep
mistrust of monopolies, a mistrust shared by many, and strenuously
articulated his opposition to them, specifically to those he saw being
embraced in the Copyright Clause. In December 1787, upon
receiving a draft of the Constitution, Jefferson wrote to Madison
expressing his general approval, but lodging his objection that it did
not contain a bill of rights.113 The bill of rights advocated by
Jefferson should provide “clearly and without the aid of sophism . . .
for the restriction against monopolies.”114 Amplifying his belief,
Jefferson later wrote, “[I]t is better . . . to abolish . . . Monopolies, in
all cases, than not to do it in any. . . . The saying there shall be no
monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on
by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14 years; but the
benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to
that of their general suppression.”115
The most concrete
recommendation Jefferson made in his correspondence with Madison
contained the following suggested alteration to the Constitution’s
language: “Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own
productions in literature . . . for a term not exceeding—years, but for
no longer term and for no longer purpose.”116 Here we find the most
direct contemporary call for a specific term limitation of copyright
protection, and supporters of later term extensions might point to this
112

Id. at 56.
Id. at 55 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), as
quoted in P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 240
(1936)).
114
Id. (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), as
quoted in P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 240
(1936)).
115
Id. at 55 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in
13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1788, 440, 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956)).
116
Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual
Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, n.53 (1995) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison (Aug. 1789) in 5 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (P.L. Ford ed.,
1895)).
113
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as a clear indication that this view was rejected implicitly when the
Constitution, and later the Bill of Rights, were ratified with no such
provision.
Responding to Jefferson’s forceful objections, Madison did not
take issue with Jefferson’s characterization of monopolies as an evil
to be avoided.117 To have done so would have been to swim against
the forceful tide of political and economic opinion. Rather, he made
the case that an exception should be made in the case of what we
now know as intellectual property: “With regard to Monopolies they
are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in Government. But
is it clear that as encouragements to literary works . . . they are not
too valuable to be wholly renounced?”118 Here, Madison tries to
defuse the power of Jefferson’s objections by falling back on the
“promot[ing] progress” rationale embraced since the Statute of
Anne,119 and foreshadows the debate that has dogged copyright term
extensions up until today—does granting additional protection
somehow benefit the public by creating incentives for genius?
III. THE COPYRIGHT ACTS OF 1790, 1831, 1909, AND 1976
Empowered by the newly ratified Constitution, the First Congress
quickly passed the Copyright Act of 1790, which adhered closely to
its model, England’s Statute of Anne, in both form and substance.120
117
Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright
and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 57 (2000) (citing Letter from James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1788-1789,
at 17 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956)).
118
Id.
119
8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
120
Id. Commentators have argued that the CTEA invites increased judicial scrutiny and
demands close examination in an historical light because not only does it not comport with
the Copyright Clause, but also because it is inconsistent with its model, the Statute of Anne.
See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 25, at 659:
The British Statute of Anne, the precursor to the American Copyright Clause,
was adopted for the purpose of reducing the monopoly power of the
publishing industry and decentralizing that power by placing it in the hands of
individual authors. The marketing and concomitant lobbying power of the
copyright industries, and their repeated victories at the expense of individual
authors (most particularly in the work-made-for-hire context) is a clarion call
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It granted an initial copyright protection term of fourteen years, and
provided for a renewal term of fourteen years if the author was still
living at the expiration of the initial term.121 Concerned by the
greater protection received by foreign authors than by Americans,122
Congress in 1831 lengthened the initial term to twenty-eight years,
keeping the renewal term at fourteen years.123 In 1909, Congress
rejected suggestions that it adopt a copyright term based on the life
of the author, and instead expanded the renewal term to twenty-eight
years, resulting in a total term of fifty-six years, provided the author
survived the initial term and complied with filing formalities.124 In
1976, Congress undertook the first major revision of the copyright
regime in over sixty years, and after intense, decades-long lobbying,
decided finally to base the protection term on the life of the author,
settling on the term of life plus fifty years.125
The rationales provided for the extensions of the copyright term
between 1790 and 1976 have varied, but with the exception of the
1831 extension, each has at least paid lip service to the constitutional
purpose of “promot[ing] progress.” As a result, whatever one
thought of the merits of the ever-increasing terms of copyright
protection, they were effectively protected from constitutional attack
in this arena where Congress was explicitly acting within its
enumerated powers.
IV. HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS IN ELDRED
With the historical context provided by Parts Two and Three in
to the Court to read the Copyright Clause with fresh attention and historical
understanding.
121
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
122
7 Cong. Deb. App. CXIX-CXX (1830) (remarks of Representative Ellsworth), cited
in Patry, supra note 85, at 917. Of course, this argument is echoed in the legislative history
of the CTEA. See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1998) (stating that the CTEA will “provide
significant trade benefits by substantially harmonizing U.S. copyright law to that of the
European Union”).
123
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16 §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436.
124
17 U.S.C. § 12 (1909) (repealed 1978).
125
Pub. L. No. 94-553 §§ 302-305, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76 (1976) (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.).
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mind, this Part evaluates the historical claims made in Eldred in light
of the evidence available, discussing the arguments’ disposition by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The majority appears to be on firmer historical ground than the
dissent. The majority, in affirming the constitutionality of the
CTEA, has a strong textual argument that the phrase “for limited
times,” without more, does not tie the hands of Congress if it
determines that the existing term of copyright protection is not
adequate to “promote progress.” It reasons in a straightforward
manner that simply adding one “limited time” to an existing “limited
time” does not somehow make the resulting term something other
than a “limited time.”126 The deferential tack taken by the majority
signals an embrace of consolidated federal power, specifically that
vested in the Congress—a move that would make Federalists smile
and Anti-Federalists cringe were they alive today.127
Further, the majority has over 200 years of precedent on its side,
significantly starting with the Copyright Act of 1790, which granted
copyright protection to existing works.128 Several extensions of the
copyright term that followed, from the 1831 Act and the 1909 Act
126
See Eldred II, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Opponents of the CTEA decry
what they see as Congress’s attempt to circumvent the Copyright Clause’s “limited times”
restriction. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Eldred v. Ashcroft, (2001) (No. 01618) (“Under the authority of this case, Congress can now continue the practice of
extending the term of subsisting copyrights without limit. It can thus achieve a perpetual
copyright term ‘on the installment plan.’”) (quoting Statement of Professor Peter Jaszi, The
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995, Hearings on S.483 Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong. (1995), available at 1995 WL 10524355, at *6).
127
Plaintiffs, of course, advocate a more active role for judicial review in the arena of
copyright. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of the
Petition at 4, Eldred v. Ashcroft (2001) (No. 01-618) (“It is well-settled that the
[c]onstitutional language conferring a power on Congress constrains the scope of that
power.”). The brief invokes no less an authority for this proposition than Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803): “The ‘powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and . . . those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the [C]onstitution is written.’” Id. These arguments are bolstered by an appeal to the Court
to halt the copyright regime’s slide down the slippery slope characterized by eleven term
extensions in the past forty years, and capped by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998), (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
1201) (prohibiting circumvention of technological protections of works without carving out
a fair use privilege). See supra Brief of Amici Curiae, at 7-8.
128
See Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 374.
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through the 1976 Act, made their extensions effective
retrospectively.129 Any argument to the contrary that is purportedly
based on history and custom, therefore, faces an uphill battle.130
The majority rests its construction of the Copyright Clause on
Schnapper, which appears to be wrongly decided in that it advances
a tortured reading of the text, holding that “the introductory language
of the Copyright Clause [does not] constitute a limit on congressional
power.’”131 This reading is difficult to support in that it seems to
labor to construe individually parts of a sentence that should be read
as a whole. Nevertheless, even putting aside its reliance on
Schnapper, the majority is on solid footing when it decides that the
CTEA does not exceed the limits placed on Congressional power by
the preambular language of the Copyright Clause, since it is
Congress, not the judiciary, that is left to determine the appropriate
term required to “promote progress.” If it decides that the historical
fear of monopolies and monopoly-like rights is overblown and
should be put aside in favor of expanding copyright protection, that
decision appears largely insulated from scrutiny.
The dissent presents an appealing policy-based criticism of the
CTEA, one that resonates at a core level with those who, like
Jefferson, have an elemental abhorrence of government-sanctioned
monopolies.132 However, when we look at the rejection of
Jefferson’s plea that the Constitution contain a specific term limit on
copyright protection,133 it becomes clear that the founders chose
another course, one that allowed monopolies in the realm of
copyright because they—and subsequent Congresses—thought the
public benefits would outweigh the costs. Whether that has played
out or not is a question better handled by scholars and
129
See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 14-15, Eldred v. Ashcroft (2001) (No.
01-618) (emphasizing historical practice to refute the supposition that granting term
extensions to existing copyrights is a per se violation of the Copyright Clause).
130
However, see Heald & Sherry, supra note 10, at 1151-52 (advancing the argument
that these retrospective extensions were so few and far between prior to the twentieth
century that in terms of historical practice, they should be seen as the exceptions rather than
the rule).
131
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
132
See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
133
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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commentators134 than by courts. And more important for this
discussion, the policy determination of the proper term of protection
is a matter better settled by Congress than by the judiciary.
CONCLUSION: THE USEFULNESS OF HISTORY
History is quite a helpful guide in determining whether the CTEA
is consistent with the Copyright Clause. Despite the lack of debate at
the Federal Convention over its contents, we have a substantial body
of evidence on which to draw when seeking to shed light on the
founders’ intent.
This evidence includes English precedent,
primarily the Statue of Anne,135 which was hugely influential on the
policies, on the text, and even on the specific term of copyright
protection—fourteen years—contained in the Copyright Act of
1790.136 Beyond that, we have the writings of participants in the
Pennsylvania and North Carolina ratifying conventions, registering
their strong support for the ideas that federal copyright law was
desirable and that it needed to be authorized by the Constitution,
implicitly shunting aside the dual fears of monopoly and grasping
national power.137
Next we have Madison’s Federalist 43 in which he asserts the
unquestioned benefits of copyright protection that would be
manifested in cultural progress.138 We know, in fact, that these
benefits were far from unquestioned, however, by looking at the
exchanges between Jefferson and Madison on the subject of
monopolies in general and in the realm of copyright specifically.139
134
See generally SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) (arguing that the
entire modern copyright regime’s bent toward property-rights fundamentalism is
inconsistent with the founders’ intent); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (warning that the richness and
variety of publicly accessible creative materials is shrinking, perhaps irretrievably, as a
result of current conceptions of intellectual property).
135
8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
136
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
137
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
138
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
139
See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, the founders felt that the cultural benefits derived from
securing exclusive rights to authors more than counterbalanced the
temporary costs to the public posed by the monopoly.
It is with this historical record that the Supreme Court is left to
determine the constitutionality of the CTEA,140 and while a more
robust historical record would be welcome, it is of course not
forthcoming. What we have is enough, in my opinion, to say with
some degree of confidence that the CTEA, despite valid and
appealing policy objections, passes constitutional muster under the
Copyright Clause.

140

As is common with pending cases, observers will be tempted to guess at the Justices’
likely positions. For example, many will point to then-Professor Stephen Breyer’s article,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970), in which he argues that the copyright
regime may be overprotective, frustrating the founders’ attempts to balance public access
and the reward to creators. However, extrapolating from writings produced in a different
context, and in this case more than thirty years ago, is always a dicey business. Here, it is
made even more risky given the complex factual background and multiple constitutional
considerations at play.

